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Metacognition refers to the monitoring and regulation of cognitive processes and
its impairment can lead to a lack of self-awareness of deficits, or anosognosia. In
the context of different neurological and psychiatric disorders (e.g., traumatic brain
injury, dementia, and schizophrenia), studies have shown that patients who present
impairments in metacognitive abilities may be able to recognize such difficulties in
others and in themselves when exposed to material in a third-person perspective.
Considering that metacognitive impairments are an important characteristic of dementia,
especially in Alzheimer’s Disease (AD), studies of the relationship between metacognition
and perspective-taking may be relevant to improve the quality of life of people with
dementia. The current paper first briefly addresses the theme of metacognition and
the impact of metacognitive deficits in people with AD. The focus then turns to the
relationship between metacognition and perspective-taking in different neurological
and psychiatric disorders, particularly AD. This relationship is also discussed based
on theoretical models, particularly the Cognitive Awareness Model (CAM). Specifically,
the CAM suggests the existence of distinct memory systems for self- and other-
information, an idea which is supported by neuroimaging findings. We suggest that
the Default Mode Network, as it has been shown to be implicated in self vs. other
processing and is affected early in AD, could explain the impact of perspective-taking
on awareness of deficits in AD. Finally, we present possible clinical implications of
the relationship between metacognition and perspective-taking in AD. Indeed, we
considered the possibility of improving patient’s awareness through the use of a
third-person perspective, which, consequently, may decrease the negative impacts of
anosognosia in AD.
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INTRODUCTION
Increases in life expectancy are now well documented worldwide. With an aging population, the
number of people who suffer from dementia is also increasing. According to Alzheimer’s Disease
International (2015), 46.8 million people are currently living with dementia, and studies suggest
that this number will increase in the near future, with estimations of double the number of people
who are affected by dementia by 2030 (Wimo et al., 2006).
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With the aim of promoting a better quality of life in people
with dementia (PwD), the theme of metacognition is particularly
relevant. The awareness of deficits relies on metacognitive
abilities, which are shown to be compromised in PwD (Cosentino
and Stern, 2005). In fact, a lack of awareness about behavioral
and/or cognitive deficits, referred to as anosognosia, is a common
characteristic of dementia (Morris and Hannesdottir, 2004;
Mograbi et al., 2012), with an important impact on patients and
their caregivers (Bertrand et al., 2013).
Within this context, this review first addresses the theme of
metacognition and the impact of metacognitive deficits in PwD,
especially in Alzheimer’s Disease (AD). The focus then turns to
the relationship between metacognition and perspective-taking
in AD. Studies that explore metacognitive abilities in different
neurological and psychiatric disorders have suggested that the
perspective through which information is presented may impact
the patient’s awareness of his own deficits. Such studies have
investigated the impact of perspective-taking on metacognitive
abilities from two angles: self-observation through a third-person
perspective (e.g., observing oneself from the outside through
a video) and the evaluation of another person’s performance.
The concept of perspective-taking is usually defined as the
ability to take another person’s point of view (Ryskin et al.,
2015). However, as it has already been done in the literature
(Brugger, 2002; Besharati et al., 2015), in the current review,
we will use the term “perspective-taking” to refer to the
two perspectives explained above (self-observation in a third-
person perspective and other-observation). The relationship
between perspective-taking and awareness is discussed based
on the Cognitive Awareness Model (CAM) (Agnew and
Morris, 1998; Morris and Hannesdottir, 2004; Hannesdottir
and Morris, 2007; Morris and Mograbi, 2013). Finally, we
present possible clinical implications of this relationship in
dementia.
METACOGNITION
Metacognition is defined as the knowledge and reflective
capacities one has concerning one’s own cognitive functioning
(Flavell, 1979). Considering the original conceptualization
proposed by Flavell (1979), metacognition can be divided into
metacognitive knowledge (which represents acquired knowledge
about one’s own and also other people’s cognitive processes)
and metacognitive experience (which permits the updating of
metacognitive knowledge and activation of strategies during
cognitive processes). Nelson and Narens (1990) proposed another
influential model of metacognition that comprises two levels
of analysis, meta-level and object-level, which operate in an
interrelated fashion. The meta-level receives information from
the object-level through a monitoring process, and the meta-
level regulates the object-level through a control process. There
are some parallels between this model and the conceptualization
of metacognition proposed by Flavell (1979). The monitoring
process can be seen as “metacognitive knowledge,” and the
control process can be seen as “metacognitive experience” in
Flavell’s description of metacognition.
The literature on metacognitive abilities indicates that
deficits in metacognition and anosognosia are referred to
interchangeably. However, as highlighted by Souchay (2007),
the two terms rely on different theoretical frameworks. The
concept of anosognosia focuses on deficits in awareness in
clinical populations, and the notion of metacognition is based
on the functioning of awareness in normal populations.
However, anosognosia and metacognition are closely related
concepts. Based on the metacognitive theories described above,
anosognosia can be seen as a deficit at the level of metacognitive
knowledge or monitoring processes. Indeed, anosognosia is
defined as the diminished ability to recognize the presence or
appreciate the severity of deficits (Babinski, 1914). In other terms,
it refers to a lack of awareness about deficits or the condition
and is described in cases of various neurological conditions, such
as aphasia, hemiplegia, and dementia (Stuss, 1991; Stuss et al.,
2005; Ries et al., 2007; Mograbi et al., 2009). For example, in the
case of anosognosia for hemiplegia, patients would state that they
are capable of moving their paralyzed limb despite contradictory
evidence (Orfei et al., 2007).
Unawareness of cognitive impairments are common
characteristics of AD (Morris and Hannesdottir, 2004; Morris
and Mograbi, 2013). The estimates of prevalence have varied
widely across studies, ranging from 23 to 81%, likely because of
differences in criteria and assessment methods (Antoine et al.,
2004; Mograbi et al., 2012; Sousa et al., 2015). Nevertheless,
studies that explore anosognosia in PwD with large samples have
consistently reported a prevalence above 30% (Starkstein et al.,
2006, 2007). In a large epidemiological study (n = 897), Mograbi
et al. (2012) showed that 78% of PwD are unaware of their
memory impairment. The multidimensional aspect of awareness
also contributes to variations in the reported prevalence in
dementia. In fact, there is considerable variability in the
presentation and severity of anosognosia, with unawareness
ranging from slight minimization to complete denial of problems
(Clare et al., 2005). Additionally, awareness can differ according
to its object (e.g., memory deficits, changes in activities of
daily living, and the diagnosis itself), and it is not uncommon
for patients to acknowledge problems in one sphere but not
in another (neuropsychological deficits vs. behavioral and
psychological symptoms) (Kotler-Cope and Camp, 1995;
Vasterling et al., 1995).
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
METACOGNITION AND
PERSPECTIVE-TAKING
Studies that explored the impact of self-observation found
improvements in awareness when patients were allowed to see
themselves in a video. Through the presentation of a case-study,
Fotopoulou et al. (2009) showed that video self-observation can
be used as an efficient technique to improve the awareness of
motor deficits after stroke. These findings were replicated in
other settings. Besharati et al. (2015) described two case-studies
of patients who suffered from anosognosia for hemiplegia. At the
time of the first experimental session, one patient was in an acute
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stage of recovery (15 days post-stroke), and the other patient
was in the chronic stage (89 days post-stroke). Both patients
presented a reinstatement of motor awareness after seeing
themselves in a video, suggesting that self-observation through
a third-person perspective positively influences metacognitive
abilities. Similar results have been observed in the context of
psychosis. For example, David et al. (2012) explored the efficacy
of video-observation as a strategy to improve psychotic patients’
awareness. One group viewed a video of themselves during an
acute psychotic episode, and a second group viewed a video of
an actor who played the role of someone with acute psychosis.
The authors showed that both groups improved their awareness
regarding psychotic symptoms after watching the video. These
findings reinforced previous results that also highlighted the
potential use of video self-observation as an efficient intervention
to improve insight in psychotic patients (Davidoff et al., 1998;
Vikram et al., 2008).
The relationship between metacognition and perspective-
taking has also been explored by studying the capacity to
perceive deficits in someone else. For example, Ramachandran
and Rogers-Ramachandran (1996) showed that, in the context of
anosognosia for hemiplegia, patients were able to acknowledge
the paralysis of others, even when they were unaware of their
own paralysis. Similarly, Garrett et al. (2011) demonstrated that
schizophrenia patients who lacked awareness of their own illness
were able to accurately categorize clinical vignettes as cases of
medical illness, no illness, or psychiatric illness. Altogether, these
findings used different methods to assess awareness to highlight
the possible relationship between metacognitive processes and
perspective-taking in psychiatric and neurologic diseases.
Metacognition and Perspective-Taking in
the Context of AD
In the context of AD, a few studies have explored the issue
of perspective-taking with regard to metacognitive abilities
by asking patients with AD to evaluate the performance of
their relatives. The results indicated that AD patients were
generally accurate in predicting their caregiver’s performance,
despite difficulties in evaluating their own performance. These
results were attributable to deficits in the patients’ ability to
update their knowledge of their own cognitive functioning
(i.e., a monitoring deficit in the metacognitive process that is
restricted to the self) (McGlynn and Kaszniak, 1991; Kaszniak
and Zak, 1996). However, in a review of the neuropsychological
bases of metamemory, which is a subtype of metacognition
looking specifically at the control and monitoring of memory
performances, Kaszniak and Zak (1996) argued that such an
interpretation of these findings may be problematic because
cognitive abilities in the patients’ relatives did not decline
as sharply. Therefore, the patients may be able to make
accurate evaluations of their caregivers’ performance even when
relying on out-of-date knowledge of their relatives’ cognitive
capacities. To resolve this issue, Duke et al. (2002) used a
combination of two methods to assess awareness: predictions
and post-dictions regarding performance and discrepancies
between patient and informant reports. AD patients and their
spouses were asked to estimate each other’s performance and
the performance of a fictional patient who suffered from
moderate cognitive impairment. The estimations were made
before and after performing a verbal memory task and verbal
fluency task. Before making the predictions, the participants
were given normative data based on their own age range, their
spouse’s age range, and the fictional patient’s age range. The
results showed that AD patients overestimated themselves but
made accurate predictions and post-dictions of their spouse’s
performance. With regard to evaluating the fictional patient, both
AD patients and their caregivers overestimated performance.
These results, however, did not allow the determination of
whether AD patients’ difficulties in awareness were self-specific
or global. However, by comparing the predictions and post-
dictions, the authors suggested that some monitoring abilities,
in an on-line fashion, might be preserved in AD patients.
Indeed, the results showed that they reduced the extent of
overestimating their abilities after completing the task. To
date, this is the only study that has compared the ability
of AD patients to evaluate the performance of a well-known
person (e.g., spouse) and an unknown person (e.g., fictional
patient).
Using a vignette technique as an indirect method to assess
awareness, Clare et al. (2012a) explored the ability of PwD
(including AD, vascular dementia and mixed Alzheimer’s and
vascular dementia) to appreciate the deficits of a fictional person.
PwD, their caregivers, and older adult controls were asked to
identify and offer advice for the problems that were described
in the vignettes. Vignettes were created and described a short
scenario of a person who presented a typical case of advanced or
early stage dementia or a healthy older adult. The results showed
that, when presented with these vignettes, the participants were
able to correctly identify and offer appropriate advice for the
problem that was described in the vignette. Additionally, some of
the participants in the dementia group, even some who presented
a limited level of awareness, identified themselves spontaneously
with the situation that was presented in the vignette. These
results led the authors to suggest that the vignette method (i.e.,
a third-person perspective method) could be useful to help PwD
acknowledge their own deficits.
Based on the evaluation of a third person, Mograbi et al.
(2014) investigated the attribution of difficulty for the self
and for others. Patients with AD were asked to judge how
difficult a task was for them and would be for someone
else their own age. Two experiments were conducted using
computerized tasks. Experiment 1 used reaction time tasks, and
Experiment 2 used memory tasks. The level of task difficulty
was controlled, leading to one easy and one difficult task in
each experiment. In both experiments, the authors showed
that AD patients predicted that others would perform as well
as themselves, despite their cognitive deficits. This study also
explored correlations with premorbid personality and showed
that higher neuroticism and agreeableness were associated with
the attribution of more difficulty for the self and less difficulty
for others. These findings were interpreted by the authors as the
poor ability of people with AD to put themselves in someone
else’s position. The authors explained that the different findings
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between their results and Clare et al. (2012a) were attributable
to methodological differences. Indeed, in Mograbi et al. (2014),
the cognitive demand of the task, where participants had to
imagine themselves as someone else, was higher than in Clare
et al. (2012a), in which patients did have access to written
vignettes. Altogether, these results suggest that patients with
AD are more accurate when evaluating the performance of
someone else (e.g., caregiver or fictional person) than they are
for themselves. Nevertheless, the methods that were employed
in these studies had distinctly different features (e.g., known
vs. unknown person, vignettes vs. actual observation, prediction
of performance vs. judgment of difficulty level), thus limiting
synthesis of the findings. Moreover, to date, no study has explored
the impact of self-evaluation through a third-person perspective,
using for example video self-observation, on awareness level in
AD patients. Further research is needed to better understand
the impact of perspective-taking on the awareness of deficits
in dementia. Additionally, possible symptoms, such as a deficit
in familiarity recognition for self and other faces, should
also be considered in studies investigating the impact of
perspective-taking in dementia (Van den Stock et al., 2012,
2013). Finally, it is important to acknowledge the differences
in the underlying mechanisms of metacognitive deficits in
different types of dementia, such as AD and FTD (Salmon
et al., 2008; Rosen, 2011) and, therefore, to take those into
account when exploring self vs. other-information processing in
dementia.
Theoretical Explanation
As suggested by Morris and Mograbi (2013), the behavioral
evidence may reflect the existence of different networks that are
involved in self/other appraisal. The authors included this notion
in a reformulated version of the CAM (Agnew and Morris, 1998;
Morris and Hannesdottir, 2004; Hannesdottir and Morris, 2007;
Morris and Mograbi, 2013), which is a neurocognitive model
of anosognosia, accounting for the heterogeneous presentation
of disordered awareness, through domain-specific modules (see
Figure 1). In fact, they proposed different memory records
for self- and other-information. First, the Personal Database,
which contains semanticized representations about the self,
and the Autobiographical Conceptual Memory System, which
contains lifetime knowledge concerning experienced events,
allow the appraisal of self-evaluation. Both are relying on
personal semantics, which is acquired through personal, social,
and cultural experiences. Second, these memory systems are
separated from the Generic Memory System, which stores other
material that permits evaluations of others and is based on
general semantic knowledge.
FIGURE 1 | Cognitive Awareness Model (CAM) Morris and Mograbi (2013).
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Neuroimaging Evidence
Recent neuroimaging evidence supports the idea of different
neural bases for processing self vs. non-self information.
For example, Ruby and Decety (2001, 2003, 2004) explored
the neuroanatomical correlates of perspective-taking regarding
different domains: motor, conceptual, and emotional. The
authors showed that, for these three domains, the frontopolar,
somatosensory, and inferior parietal cortices are implicated in
the process of self vs. other distinction. As underscored by Ruby
et al. (2009), some of these brain areas, such as the orbitofrontal
cortex and temporoparietal junction, have also been shown to
be related to measures of anosognosia in AD. Additionally, these
brain regions are partially overlapping with those that comprise
the default mode network (DMN). Indeed, the DMN, activated
when participants are not engaged in a specific cognitive task,
includes the frontal, parietal and temporal regions (for review see
Buckner et al., 2008). Moreover, this network has been shown to
be affected early by AD neurodegenerative process (for review
see Mevel et al., 2011) and, as suggested by Bond et al. (2016),
the impairment of the DMN by AD neurodegeneration could
explain the differences in metacognitive abilities depending on
the perspective through which the information is presented.
However, to date, no neuroimaging study has specifically
explored the issue of perspective-taking (first- vs. third-person
perspectives) regarding metacognitive processes in AD.
Clinical Implications
The findings regarding the relationship between metacognition
and perspective-taking may have important clinical implications.
In fact, studies have shown that the lack of awareness is related to
higher engagement in risk situations, earlier institutionalization,
more difficulties with treatment adherence, and greater caregiver
burden, all of which increase the financial impact on society
(Starkstein et al., 2007; Arlt et al., 2008; Bertrand et al., 2013;
Horning et al., 2014). Interventions that increase awareness
may eventually bring important clinical benefits. Throughout
this review, we highlighted the possibility of using third-person
perspective paradigms to do so. This type of intervention has
already been successfully used with anosognosic patients with
neurological or psychiatric disorders, such as hemiplegia after
stroke or schizophrenia (Vikram et al., 2008; Fotopoulou et al.,
2009; David et al., 2012; Besharati et al., 2015). However, when
using interventions to improve awareness, caution needs to be
taken with the patient’s emotional state. Studies have shown
that awareness regarding deficits in AD may lead to negative
mood changes, including depressive symptoms (Harwood et al.,
2000; Clare et al., 2012b). Thus, further efforts need to be made
by clinicians to acknowledge changes in their patients’ mood
states during interventions that attempt to decrease the level of
anosognosia.
CONCLUSION
In summary, there is preliminary evidence suggesting that AD
patients might show better awareness when evaluating abilities
of others or themselves in a third-person perspective. These
findings are supported by the CAM, which suggests distinct
memory systems for self- and other-information, and also by
neuroimaging studies, highlighting different neural bases for self
and non-self processing. The early impairment of the DMN in
AD could explain the relationship between metacognition and
perspective-taking. Regarding possible clinical implications, we
believe that improvements in patient’s awareness through the use
of a third-person perspective may decrease the negative impacts
of anosognosia in AD. However, practitioners, psychologists,
and other health professionals who are involved in patient’s
rehabilitation must be aware of the potential psychological and
emotional consequences of increasing patients’ awareness of their
condition and impairments.
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